Note 1: I use "Leibniz Law" (perhaps wrongly) throughout the following as a substitution principle for simple or compound constant expressions -- an inference from alpha=beta to phi(alpha) iff phi(beta) -- not the law of logic involving variables: (x)(y)(x=y --> phi(x) iff phi(y)).

Note: Frege's analysis of the failure of substitution in indirect contexts is what, I claimed, does not work in your system, Skef. Here is my attempt to defend your very version Fregean semantics by arguing that Frege's analysis is phoney.

Frege appeals to a straightforward version of Leibniz Law, which in Frege-talk comes to: expressions with the same Bedeutung can be substituted for one another salva veritate. The seemingly reasonable Fregean Caveat is that for expressions that are ambiguous, the Bedeutungen must be the same in the context in which the substitution is made. Surprisingly, Frege thinks that every English expression that can appear within the scope of a so-called "shifter" is ambiguous, which seems to encompass virtually all English expressions. If we accept this, then he can explain the failure to preserve truth value when we substitute "the es" for "the ms" in an indirect context, simply by saying, "This substitution is NOT an instance of Leibniz Law because the expressions do NOT have the same Bedeutung (in context)".

Now why do I call this a phoney explanation? Because substitution in an indirect context (of any degree) actually comes down to this: the two expressions must have the same customary sense. And that's the end of it. All the nonsense about ambiguity and shifts in Bedeutung are simply a way to dress up this simple and intuitive STARTING point, to dress it up to make it look like Leibniz Law is what is at play here and that the substitution failure can be explained purely in terms of the premise of Leibniz Law being untrue (in context).

To see that Frege's analysis is phoney, consider the more obviously egregious case of direct discourse, where he does exactly the same thing. Consider the direct discourse sentence, " Skef said "the ms rises" ". Suppose it to be true. Now why can't we apply Leibniz Law to get, " Skef said "the es rises" ". Frege claims that it is because in the context of the quotation marks the ambiguous expressions "the ms" and "the es" don't have the same Bedeutung. So what is their Bedeutungen in this context? Well, themselves! How did this happen? Well, quotation marks are shifters. What do they shift the Bedeutungen to? Well, to the expression itself. But that doesn't seem intuitive, why this elaborate theory of shifters and self reference where there intuitively is none? ANSWER: because it yields the result that in a quotation context one can only replace an expression with itself, if we are to preserve truth. BUT WE ALREADY KNEW THAT ABOUT QUOTATION. So rather than providing us with a deeper understanding of quotation contexts, as perhaps Quine and I and some others have tried to do, all that Frege does is make several implausible claims about ambiguity and shifting meanings in order to force the original intuitions -- that substitutions in indirect contexts requires sameness of customary sense (not merely sameness of customary Bedeutung) and that substitutions in quotation contexts requires sameness of expression (not merely sameness of customary Bedeutung) -- into a Procrustean bed of premise-failures for Leibniz Law. The alternative is simply to say that it is obvious that Leibniz Law (in the substitution form in which I am using it) just doesn't hold for these contexts. This where we started (and should have ended).