PUTTING HUMPTY DUMPTY TOGETHER AGAIN

WHO is master, Humpty Dumpty or Humpty Dumpty’s language? Mr. MacKay compares some things I said about definite descriptions and reference to Humpty Dumpty’s theory of meaning. In doing so, I think the principle he draws from Humpty Dumpty’s conversation with Alice is that the conventions of one’s language dictate the meaning of one’s words, and intentions are powerless to intervene. Since “glory” does not mean “a nice knockdown argument” in the language Humpty Dumpty speaks, he could not have meant that by “glory” nor could “glory” have meant that in the conversation, no matter what intentions he may have had. This has some importance beyond any application to my article, since theories of meaning that take the intentions of speakers as primitive (for example, Grice’s view in his article “Meaning”) must either deny the principle or show how they avoid running afoul of it. MacKay, of course, uses Humpty Dumpty only for the purpose of drawing an analogy and there is no reason to suppose that what I said about reference commits me to any theory of meaning. Nevertheless, I will have something to say about the significance of Humpty Dumpty’s conversation with Alice and about Wittgenstein’s challenge to “Say ‘It’s cold here’ and mean ‘It’s hot here,’” because it is easy to make a mistake about them very similar to one I find in MacKay’s criticisms of my treatment of reference.

First, however, I want to discuss the connection between what MacKay says about reference and my article. The purpose of the article he discusses was to make a distinction between two uses of definite descriptions. MacKay does not deal with the distinction itself; instead, he criticizes some things I said about reference in the course of

1 I am indebted to Professor David Sachs for reading an earlier draft and making several valuable suggestions for improvement.
4 Philosophical Review, LXVI (1957), 377-388.
drawing it. Nevertheless, what he says may seem to cast doubt on the existence of a difference between two uses of definite descriptions, though I am not sure whether that was his purpose. In any case, it turns out that MacKay’s view can be shown to presuppose the distinction. To show this will require a brief look at how I attempted to draw it.

In the article in question, I pointed out several features of what I called the “referential” use of definite descriptions not shared with another use of them, which I called the “attributive” use. The two uses can be thought of as corresponding to two possible purposes a speaker may have in using a definite description. Looking at the referential use first, a speaker may wish to attribute a property to, ask a question about, issue an order concerning some particular person, object, situation, and so forth. We can view his task as that of finding a description suitable for allowing his audience to identify that person, object, situation, and so forth. The description chosen need not be unique; a speaker will often use some description such as “the table,” leaving it to his audience to determine from context or from a knowledge of the speaker’s likely wants, beliefs, and so forth to which table he is referring. The description chosen may be different for different

Strawson thought Russell’s theory of definite descriptions would have difficulty accounting for this fact, since on Russell’s view a statement such as “The table is covered with books” would be literally false so long as there is more than one table in the world. Without considering the two uses of definite descriptions, the reply that one is inclined to make on Russell’s behalf is that in the loose way of everyday speech the context is relied upon to supply further qualifications on the description to make it unique. This seems a plausible reply when considering attributive uses. Someone says, “The next President will be a dove on Viet Nam,” and context easily supplies the implicit “of the United States.” But where one has a very “indefinite” definite description, with many things in the world satisfying the actual description, the reply is not so plausible. These are commonly, I believe, referential uses. A speaker wants to refer to some object and uses an “indefinite” definite description. Asked to make his description more precise, he may have to think about how best to do it. Several further descriptions may come to mind, not all of which are actually correct. Which, then, shall we say is the full but implicit one? Once we see the function of a referential description, however, we need not suppose that there is any one description recoverable from the speech act that is supposed uniquely to apply to the object referred to. The audience may through the partial description and various clues and cues know to what the speaker refers without being in possession of a description that uniquely fits it and which was implicit all along in the speaker’s speech act. We can, I would suggest, view Russell’s theory as a theory of attributive definite descriptions against which examples drawn from referential uses are not relevant.
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audiences. Suppose, for example, that a speaker wants to relate an amusing thing done by Jones. To one audience he might begin, “The man I introduced to you yesterday . . .,” to another “Our mutual friend . . .,” to still another “The man you see over there . . ..” The distinguishing characteristic of the referential use is the existence of an entity the speaker wants to talk about and in relation to which he chooses a description as a means of referring to it. There is a sense in which the particular description chosen is inessential, though not irrelevant, to what the speaker accomplishes, in this case, telling something about Jones. The following is a familiar sort of conversation in which a speaker shows his willingness to abandon one description for another when it becomes evident that the first is not fulfilling its purpose of identifying for the audience the reference of the speaker’s remarks: “The man I introduced to you yesterday did an amusing thing.” “I don’t recall your introducing anyone to me.” “Well, perhaps I didn’t, but don’t you remember the man in the loud checked suit?” “Oh, now I know whom you mean.”

In contrast, a definite description used attributively is not in the same way dispensable; it is essential to the purpose of the speech act. As an illustration, suppose someone to make a wager, expressing his side of the bet in the words, “The winner of the Indianapolis 500 race drove a turbine-powered car.” The speaker could intend his bet to be understood not as being a bet about, say, Parnelli Jones or any other race driver, but about the winner whoever he may have been. And this could be so even if he happens to have a belief about who won the race (though, of course, he need have none). Suppose that he believes Parnelli Jones won the race; nevertheless he will expect to collect even if this belief is mistaken so long as whoever won the race did drive a turbine-powered car, and he will lose if whoever won drove an ordinary car even though Jones’s car was turbine-powered. It would be inappropriate and irrelevant to the bet for the speaker to try out a new description—for example, “the man in the red car,” when his belief about who won the race turns out to be mistaken. Similarly, if there were no winner of the 500—the race having been called before the finish—the speaker could not appropriately turn to another description, as the speaker did in the previous example when it turned out that he had not introduced anyone. Finally, if Parnelli Jones was the winner, one can still say that had he not been the winner, then what kind of car he drove would have been irrelevant to the bet.

The central difference between the two uses of definite descriptions that emerges is this. In connection with an attributive use, if we want to
identify some entity as what the speaker was talking about in using the definite description, the only candidate would be something that satisfies the description. A referential use, however, allows of another possibility—that the entity the speaker was talking about does not in fact satisfy the description. When the entity so identified does fit the description, it can nevertheless be said that had it not done so, it still would have been what the speaker was talking about. Sometimes we want to say something about an entity and try to identify it for our audience via a description of it, thus making it a possibility that the entity and description do not match up. At other times we want to talk about whatever fits a certain description (uniquely) and then there is no possibility of an entity that is at once what we wanted to talk about but not correctly characterized by the description.

As a consequence of this difference several things seemed to me to be true of a referential use that are not true of an attributive use. These were discussed in some detail in the article MacKay criticizes, so they will only be listed here. If a speaker $S$ uses a definite description, “the $\varphi$,” referentially there will be some entity $e$ (or, at least, the speaker will intend that there should be) about which the following will be true. (I assume that an assertion was made. Appropriate changes would be required for questions, commands, and so forth.)

1. $S$ will have referred to $e$ whether or not $e$ is in fact $\varphi$.
2. $S$ will have said something true or false about $e$ whether or not $e$ is in fact $\varphi$ (provided that everything is in order concerning the remainder of the speech act).
3. $S$, in using “the $\varphi$” to refer to $e$, will have presupposed or implied that $e$ is $\varphi$.
4. In reporting $S$'s speech act, it will be correct to say that he stated something about $e$ and in reporting this to use expressions to refer to $e$ other than “the $\varphi$” or synonyms of it.

This last feature is not independent of the first three. It is implicit in my use of “$e$.” It should be noted that I allow here (and strictly should throughout) for the possibility of a referential use without a referent. This would occur when no entity can be correctly identified as “what the speaker meant to be talking about,” although the speaker intended that there should be. This “failure of reference” will not come about simply because nothing is $\varphi$ or because more than one thing is $\varphi$ and, moreover, could happen when there is a unique $\varphi$. Thus it lends no support to MacKay's view. Exactly when it will happen could be specified only after an analysis of the criteria for deciding what entity it is to which a speaker is referring, an analysis I have not tried to give here or in the original paper.
Had the definite description been used attributively there would be no such entity e (nor would the speaker have intended that there should be).

The first of these characteristics is the one that bothers MacKay. His view, I believe, can be summed up in the following four points:

(A) Referring is one way among others of making it known what a speaker is talking about.

(B) In using a definite description to refer, one succeeds in referring only to something that fits the description used (barring, perhaps, "near misses").

(C) What one is talking about, however, may fail altogether to fit the description used.

(D) In that case, in view of (B), one does not succeed in referring to what one is talking about, although one may succeed in making it knowable what one is talking about.

Looking at points (C) and (D) one will notice that MacKay is describing a use of definite descriptions for which it is possible to distinguish an entity the speaker is talking about independently of the description he uses—an entity, that is, that may not fit the description. Now the use of definite descriptions that I call "referential" provides for just such a possibility. If then it can be shown that there are uses of definite descriptions, in fact those that I call "attributive," for which no such possibility exists, MacKay's view must itself yield the very distinction I wanted to make. It will still be true, of course, that there is an issue. If he is correct, the referential use of definite descriptions lacks at least one of the features I thought it had. But the distinction itself would not only remain in the face of his criticism, it would, in fact, be presupposed by it.

In his discussion, then, MacKay uses the possibility that what a speaker is talking about may fail to fit the description he uses. But looking at the example of the attributive use given above, we find that this possibility is not present. A wager is made, expressed in the words, "The winner of the Indianapolis 500 drove a turbine-powered car." The bettor collects, we imagine, if and only if the race was won by a driver in a turbine-powered car, regardless of which driver that may have been. Throughout his paper, MacKay uses the notion of "what the speaker was talking about." This is an extremely flexible expression, with many uses.7 In our example, it seems natural to say that the

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7 For this reason it would be rather unhelpful to try to give an analysis of referring utilizing this expression. For example, in one use of the expression, a
speaker was talking about the winner of the Indianapolis 500 race (and that the bet was a bet about the winner of this race). But the expression “X was talking about Y,” as it finds application in this example, is an intentional or “referentially opaque” context with respect to “Y.” Suppose that Smith was a driver in the race. In making the wager in question, could the speaker have been talking about Smith? If Smith was not the winner of the race, then certainly there seems to be no sense in which the speaker was talking about him (and the bet was not a bet about Smith). Even if, at the time of the bet, the speaker believed Smith to be the winning driver, he was not, I think, talking about him. 8 This is enough to show that in this use of a definite description there is not the possibility that the speaker is talking about an entity that, in fact, fails to fit the description he uses. It seems to me, moreover, that even if Smith was the winner of the race, the speaker was not talking about him. From “The speaker was talking about the winner of the race” and “Smith was the winner of the race,” it does not follow, in this case, that the speaker was talking about Smith.

To state his view about reference and definite descriptions, MacKay employed a notion of “what the speaker is talking about” that is extensional and allows for the possibility that what the speaker is talking about is an entity that fails to fit the description he used. But this notion is applicable only to some uses of definite descriptions and these would have to be distinguished from those to which it does not apply. Working out this distinction, however, would simply give us another way of getting at the difference between the “referential” and the “attributive” use of definite descriptions.

MacKay notes that in my paper many of the examples of a speaker referring to something that does not fit the description used are what he calls “near misses.” Could I have sustained my point, he wonders, had I instead considered examples in which what the speaker intended to refer to was very far from fitting the description? 9 Before dealing with

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8 The speaker could lose his bet even if Smith drove a turbine-powered car and he could win it even if Smith did not.

9 Not all of my examples could be considered “near misses”—e.g., the example of misdescribing Jones as “Smith’s murderer” (p. 286) when he is innocent, or of referring to a rock as “the man carrying a walking stick” (p. 296).
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this directly, however, I want to comment on another question raised by the subject of near misses.

In my paper I suggested that when a speaker uses a definite description, “the φ,” referentially to refer to something, e, he may have said something true about e even if e is not φ or even if nothing is φ. In contrast, I thought, if the definite description is used attributively, then if nothing is φ, the speaker cannot have said something true (I left it open whether he would then have said something false). The reason for this difference is that in the case of the attributive use there is no entity e standing as the referent whether or not it fits the description, and so there is nothing for the speaker to have predicated something of when nothing satisfies the description. But this does not take account of near misses and so is, perhaps, too rigid in relation to our actual practice in such cases. In one example of the attributive use in my paper, a person upon finding the body of his friend Smith exclaims, “Smith’s murderer is insane.” In the example, the speaker had no particular person in mind as Smith’s murderer. I then asked what the consequences were if Smith in fact had not been murdered and I suggested that the speaker could not have said something true. But suppose that while Smith did die of natural causes, he had indeed been assaulted before death and that the evidence that led the speaker to attribute insanity to “Smith’s murderer” is still good evidence that his assailant is insane. In a sense the speaker has scored a “near miss.” Are we prepared to say flatly that the speaker did not state the truth? Since some of my examples of referential uses of definite descriptions also involved in some sense “near misses,” this sort of consideration has led several people to wonder whether there is any difference between the two uses along these lines.

But if I ignored the possibility of near misses in connection with what I called “attributive” uses, the distinction is not really harmed. For there are two sources of near misses, one for the attributive use and another for the referential. A near miss occurs with an attributive use when nothing exactly fits the description used, but some individual or other does fit a description in some sense close in meaning to the one used. It is a quite different sort of near miss, however, that is recognized by seeing that the particular individual the speaker wanted to refer to has been described in a slightly inaccurate way. In the one case a near miss is scored, we might say, when the speaker just misses some target or other; in the other when he just misses the target he aimed at. Only in the referential use can a speaker have “missed by a mile,” because only that use involves a particular entity that the description either fits
neatly, just misses, or misses wildly. Once this is seen, taking near misses into account does not blur the distinction. If anything, it helps one to see what the distinction is.

MacKay holds that when a speaker grossly misdescribes what he wants to talk about, he does not succeed in referring to it. He admits, in a footnote, that this may seem to be no more than a verbal dispute—what he calls "what the speaker is talking about" I call "what the speaker is referring to." If, as I have argued above, his view of the matter yields the distinction in uses of definite descriptions I wanted to draw, why is it not a verbal issue? It is not a question of the ordinary use of the verb "to refer." (I think, in fact, considerations of that sort may be more on my side than his.) Neither of us seems to be analyzing the ordinary use of the term. What then are the unacceptable consequences of adopting my way of talking about such cases?

MacKay imagines someone intending to refer to a book saying, "Bring me the rock on the table." On my view this should be a perfectly clear case of referring to a book. But, he argues, "If one can refer to a book by using 'the rock,' then one can refer to a book by using any o.r.e. [ostensible referring expression], and so the actual o.r.e. used becomes irrelevant." MacKay's conclusion does not immediately follow. It does not follow from the fact that we can imagine some circumstances in which a speaker refers to a book by using the definite description, "the rock," that we can imagine this happening in any circumstances. But the latter would be required to make the particular definite description used irrelevant. From what I said in my article it is only in some circumstances that we can imagine a speaker referring to a book by using the definite description, "the rock"—namely, when he really does intend to refer to something which is in fact a book, by using the definite description, "the rock." This may seem hardly any limitation at all, but that, I believe, is the interesting mistake in MacKay's criticism. I believe the route MacKay's reasoning takes is the following. In the speech acts we are considering, it is the speaker's intention to refer to something. If he can accomplish this when he uses a definite description for that purpose regardless of the content of the description, then the content cannot matter to him—"the actual o.r.e. used becomes irrelevant." He might as well use one description as another so long as he uses them with the right intention. And this result is absurd. This is where the analogy with Humpty Dumpty enters. Humpty Dumpty thinks that he invests a word with meaning simply by using it with the intention that it shall mean that. But then it seems that it should be irrelevant to him what word he uses. I think this line of
reasoning contains a mistake. No such consequence really follows from my way of talking about referring or even from Humpty Dumpty’s theory of meaning, whatever other defects there may be in that. Because it has some independent interest, I will begin with Humpty Dumpty’s theory.

“Glory” does not mean “a nice knockdown argument” in the language Humpty Dumpty speaks. Does it follow that “glory” could not have meant that in the conversation with Alice? Or that Humpty Dumpty did not mean that by “glory”? It is not my purpose here to defend a theory of meaning based on the intentions of speakers. My limited purpose is to suggest that no disastrous consequences follow from the position that what a speaker refers to in a referential use of a definite description is determined by his intentions. (I hope it is obvious that adopting this viewpoint on reference does not commit one to any such theory of meaning.) Nevertheless, the mistake I believe Mr. MacKay commits in his criticism of what I had to say about reference seems one that it would be easy to commit in thinking about Humpty Dumpty’s conversation. If so, it may be of interest to look at it in that connection. In outline, what I want to show is that there is an explanation of the absurdity we find in the exchange with Alice that is compatible with theories of meaning based on the intentions of speakers. Similarly, the inability to respond to Wittgenstein’s challenge to “Say ‘It’s cold here’ and mean ‘It’s hot here’” can be explained without subscribing to a particular view such as that meaning can arise only in the context of an established practice. Finally, I will try to show that the availability of this sort of explanation means that speaking of reference in the way I did does not have the consequences MacKay believes it does.

Humpty Dumpty believes himself to be master of the meaning of his words in that if he intends a word to mean such and such then it will mean that when he uses it. MacKay, in making use of what he considers an absurd theory of meaning for the purpose of comparing it to what I said about reference, seems to find no difficulty in the possibility of Humpty Dumpty forming the intention to mean by a word what it does not standardly mean, while at the same time having no reason at all to suppose that his audience, Alice, will understand him. Forming the intention to mean “a nice knockdown argument” by the word “glory” in such circumstances may seem as easy as falling off a wall. Similarly, MacKay finds nothing odd about the possibility that a person should simply intend to refer to a book by the words “the rock.” What goes wrong, he seems to think, is that the intention cannot be fulfilled. After
all, one might say, what could be easier than forming an intention? And if intentions were sufficient, then a speaker could mean anything by any word at any time or refer to anything using any definite description at any time. Or so it may seem.

The fact about intentions that I want to stress is that they are essentially connected with expectations. Ask someone to flap his arms with the intention of flying. In response he can certainly wave his arms up and down, just as one can easily on command say the words "It's cold here." But this is not to do it with the intention of flying. Nor does it seem to me that a normal adult in normal circumstances can flap his arms and in doing so really have that intention. Perhaps one can, by a stretch of the imagination, conceive of someone (a child, say, who has seen birds flying) doing this. But such a person—the child, for example—would have expectations not shared with us. Similarly, one cannot say entirely out of the blue, "It's cold here" and mean "It's hot here," but not, I think, because whatever one's intentions the words will not get invested with that meaning. Rather, we can explain this by the impossibility of having the right intention in such circumstances. To the next person who comes in the room I say, "It's cold here." I have no expectations, any more than Humpty Dumpty did about Alice, that the person will construe my words in a novel way. Could I really intend that "cold" should mean "hot"? Or would my performance not be so much arm-flapping?

In the analysis of meaning given by Grice, a speaker means something by an utterance when he has a certain complex kind of intention involving recognition on the part of his audience of his intention. And what the speaker means is determined by the content of that intention. Whether he can form that intention, however, may depend upon what expectations he has about his audience and their ability to grasp his intention. It does not follow, then, from this analysis that speakers might, out of the blue, mean anything at all by any utterance. And the existence of an established practice may be usually required for speakers to have the right expectations.

10 The exact connection is probably complicated and I have, I think, oversimplified it in what follows. What we can do with a certain intention not only depends upon expectations, but also upon the possibility of other means of accomplishing the same end and upon incentives. A man in the water from a sinking ship might move his arms with the intention of swimming a hundred miles to shore, if that is the only hope, even though he has no rational expectation of doing it. But is it open to an ordinary man at the beach to strike out with that intention?

11 In "Meaning," op. cit.
Had Humpty Dumpty prefaced his comment to Alice with an explicit stipulation of what he would mean by the word “glory,” the episode could not have been used by Lewis Carroll to raise a problem about meaning. By stating that he would mean “a nice knockdown argument” by “glory,” Humpty Dumpty could expect Alice to understand him correctly when he said, “There’s glory for you.” I think the episode would also lose its interest if there were in the situation something implicit to make it possible for Humpty Dumpty to expect Alice to grasp his intention. If I were to end this reply to MacKay with the sentence “There’s glory for you” I would be guilty of arrogance and, no doubt, of overestimating the strength of what I have said, but given the background I do not think I could be accused of saying something unintelligible. I would be understood, and would I not have meant by “glory” “a nice knockdown argument”? Would not “glory” in that last sentence mean that? It is at least not obvious that it would not. But, for all I know, no one (except possibly Humpty Dumpty) has ever meant that by “glory,” and there is not an established practice or convention backing it up. What is strange about Humpty Dumpty’s conversation may not be so much the theory of meaning that he seems to have, but rather his wanting us to believe that, without any assumption that Alice might understand him, he really did have that intention about the word “glory.” I cannot credit him with that intention any more than I could credit a seemingly rational adult with the intention to fly when I see him flapping his arms up and down.

Returning now to reference, given the way I talked about the referential use of definite descriptions, one can imagine circumstances in which someone refers to a book by using the words “the rock.” But it does not follow that, for example, I can now refer to a book by saying to the next person to come into the room, “Please bring me the rock.” To think that it does involves the view just now discussed, that there is no difficulty in forming any intention whatever. The reason I cannot say that to the next person I see and refer to a book is the same as the reason I cannot now say to that person, “It’s cold here” and mean “It’s hot here.” I do not have the right expectations about my audience. In the same way I cannot now flap my arms intending to fly. What we have to imagine are situations in which a person does really intend to refer to a book in saying “the rock,” and these are not so easy to come by. Most of the examples in my paper of speakers referring to things that do not fit the description used had the speaker believing that what he wanted to refer to did fit the description. Thus, if by a trick of light what is a book looks to me like a rock, I am inclined to say that I would
have referred to a book in saying "Bring me the rock." I would, of course, have reason to expect this description to enable my audience to pick out what I was referring to (even though in this case I may be wrong about it). As an extreme case I also thought that one could refer to something knowing that it did not fit the description used, but again when one had certain expectations about the audience. To change the example slightly, suppose there is a rock on my shelf that has been carefully carved to resemble a book and that I know the person I am speaking to cannot recognize it for what it is. I say to him, "Bring me the book with the blue binding." It seems at least plausible to say that I referred to a rock. One might put the matter this way. Saying "the book" while merely thinking "the rock" does not constitute referring to the rock, but neither does it constitute having the intention to refer to the rock. What MacKay has ignored is the fact that the intention to refer to something in using a definite description is a complex intention involving expectations regarding one's audience. When a speaker uses a definite description referentially he intends his audience to take the description as characterizing what it is he wants to talk about. In so doing he hopes that they will successfully recognize what that is. The content of the description is clearly relevant to this intention and not something the speaker can ignore. Now if we choose to characterize the situation in which the speaker genuinely has such an intention with respect to an object, his audience, and a description, but where the description chosen fails to fit the object, as a situation in which the speaker referred to the object, no dire consequences ensue.¹²

The role of the content of a definite description used to refer comes out in another way. Suppose that two friends have a private joke about

¹² The situation might be summed up through an analogy. Imagine the following game of "describing." A player chooses some object and attempts to describe it. His purpose is to get a description that allows the other players to recognize the object he has chosen. Sometimes, however, a player's description will fail to characterize the object correctly. Given enough imagination we can even envisage the situation in which the object is a book and the description is "a rock." When a player grossly misses in this way, should we say that he has not described the object? Or should we say that he has described it, but incorrectly? This seems to be a verbal issue. If we opt for the second way, however, we will not be forced to say that the description a player uses is irrelevant just because even when he chooses the wrong one, we still say that he has described the object. (We can also imagine a game analogous to the attributive use of definite descriptions. Here a player does not first choose an object to describe. Rather he gives a description with the aim of giving one that uniquely fits some object or other.)
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a certain book; reading it is such heavy going that they call it "the rock." One of them might say to the other, "Bring me the rock" and in doing so refer to that book. But this would not be a definite description used referentially. The expression "the rock" is being used rather like a name. The standard meaning of "rock" has no more than historical connection with its use here in referring to something. The two friends might even have forgotten how it came about that they call this book "the rock." In the same way it may be possible to imagine some private joke or other background that makes it suitable for a speaker using the phrase "the square root of two" to refer to a book. But it seems to me impossible to imagine a speaker to use this phrase in its standard meaning as a definite description used referentially. The reason is that I cannot conceive of the set of beliefs that would allow a speaker to suppose that this description was a means to fulfilling the intention of making it known to his audience what he is talking about via the content of the description. I can imagine a speaker mistaking a book for a rock or believing that his audience will, but I cannot imagine someone mistaking a book for the square root of two.

I have hoped to make two points in reply to MacKay. The first is that the distinction between two uses of definite descriptions can be drawn as easily in the terminology MacKay prefers as in that I used. Secondly, the dire consequences of adopting my way of talking about referring that MacKay foresees really do not materialize.

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